JFK, Indonesia, CIA and Freeport Sulphur
       ReturnThis article first appeared in Probe magazine and is reprinted here 
      with express permission.
      JFK, Indonesia, 
      CIA & Freeport Sulphur
      by Lisa Pease

      What is Past is Prologue.
      Inscribed on the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
      In Part One of this article (Probe, March-April, 1996) we talked about the 
      early years of Freeport up through the Cuban takeover of their potentially 
      lucrative mine at Moa Bay, as well as their run-in with President Kennedy 
      over the issue of stockpiling. But the biggest conflict that Freeport 
      Sulphur would face was over the country housing the world's single largest 
      gold reserve and third largest copper reserve: Indonesia. To understand 
      the recent (March, 1996) riots at the Freeport plant, we need to go to the 
      roots of this venture to show how things might have been very different 
      had Kennedy lived to implement his plans for Indonesia. 
      Indonesia Backstory
      Indonesia had been discovered by the Dutch at the end of the 1500s. During 
      the early 1600s they were dominated by the Dutch East Indies Company, a 
      private concern, for nearly 200 years. In 1798, authority over Indonesia 
      was transferred to the Netherlands, which retained dominion over this 
      fifth largest country in the world until 1941, at which time the Japanese 
      moved in during the course of World War II. By 1945 Japan was defeated in 
      Indonesia and Achmed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta rose to become President 
      and Vice President of the newly independent Indonesia. But within a month 
      of the Sukarno/Hatta proclamation of independence, British army units 
      began landing in Jakarta to help the Dutch restore colonial rule. Four 
      years of fighting ensued. In 1949, the Dutch officially ceded sovereignty 
      back to Indonesia, with the exception of one key area - that of a hotspot 
      which is now known as Irian Jaya or, depending on who you talk to, West 
      Papua. 
      Authors Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, in their book Thy Will Be 
      Done, explain the situation in what was then called Dutch New Guinea: 
        To Westerners, New Guinea was like a gifted child pulled in opposite 
        directions by covetous guardians. The Dutch clung to the western half as 
        the sole remnant of their once-vast East Indies empire. Their longtime 
        British allies, acting through Australia, controlled the eastern half. 
        Neighboring Indonesians, on the other hand, thought that all New Guinea 
        was part of their national territory, even if it was still colonized by 
        Europeans.
      Dutch New Guinea, or West Irian as the Indonesians called it, was 
      populated by native tribes not far removed from a stone age culture, such 
      as the Danis and the Amungme. When Indonesia fought to claim independence 
      from the Dutch, West Irian became a symbol for both sides that neither 
      wanted to relinquish. It would take the efforts of President Kennedy to 
      eventually pass control of this area to the newly independent Indonesians, 
      removing the last vestiges of Dutch colonialism.
      Indonesia experienced various types of government. When Sukarno first rose 
      to power in 1945, foreigners pointed out that Sukarno's rule appeared 
      "fascistic," since he held sole control over so much of the government. 
      Bowing to foreign pressure to appear more democratic, Indonesia instituted 
      a parliamentary system of rule and opened the government to a multiparty 
      system. Sukarno related what followed to his biographer (now cable gossip 
      show host) Cindy Adams: 
        In a nation previously denied political activities, the results were 
        immediate. Over 40 dissimilar parties sprang up. So terrified were we of 
        being labeled "a Japanese-sponsored Fascistic dictatorship" that single 
        individuals forming splinter organizations were tolerated as 
        "mouthpieces of democracy." Political parties grew like weeds with 
        shallow roots and interests top-heavy with petty selfishness and 
        vote-catching. Internal strife grew. We faced disaster, endless 
        conflicts, hair-raising confusion. Indonesians previously pulling 
        together now pulled apart. They were sectioned into religious and 
        geographical boxes, just what I'd sweated all my life to get them out 
        of. 
      Sukarno related that nearly every six months, a cabinet fell, and a new 
      government would start up, only to repeat the cycle. On October 17, 1952 
      things came to a head. Thousands of soldiers from the Indonesian army 
      stormed the gates with signs saying "Dissolve Parliament." Sukarno faced 
      the troops directly, firmly refusing to dissolve parliament due to 
      military pressure, and the soldiers backed down. The result of this was a 
      factionalized army. There were the "pro-17 October 1952 military" and the 
      "anti-17 October 1952 military." In 1955, elections were held and 
      parliamentary rule was ended by vote. The Communists, who had done the 
      most for the people suffering the aftereffects of converting from colonial 
      rule to independence, won many victories in 1955 and 1956. In 1955, 
      Sukarno organized the Bandung Conference at which the famous Chinese 
      Communist Chou En Lai was a featured guest. During the 1955 elections, the 
      CIA had given a million dollars to the Masjumi party-an opposition party 
      to both Sukarno's Nationalist party and the Communist party in Indonesia 
      (called the PKI)-in an attempt to gain political control of the country. 
      But the Masjumi party failed to win the hearts and minds of the people. 
      In 1957, an assassination attempt was made against Sukarno. Although the 
      actual perpetrators were unknown at the time, both Sukarno and the CIA 
      jumped to use this for propaganda purposes. The CIA was quick to blame the 
      PKI. Sukarno, however, blamed the Dutch, and used this as the excuse to 
      seize all former Dutch holdings, including shipping and flying lines. 
      Sukarno vowed to drive the Dutch out of West Irian. He had already tried 
      settling the long-standing dispute over that territory through the United 
      Nations, but the vote fell shy of the needed two-thirds majority to set up 
      a commission to force the Dutch to sit down with the Indonesians. The 
      assassination attempt provided a much needed excuse for action.
      The victories of the Communists, infighting in the army, and the 1957 
      nationalization of former Dutch holdings, led to a situation of grave 
      concern to American business interests, notably the oil and rubber 
      industries. The CIA eagerly pitched in, helping to foment rebellion 
      between the outer, resource rich, islands, and the central government 
      based in Jakarta, Java. 
      Rockefeller Interests in Indonesia
      Two prominent American-based oil companies doing business in Indonesia at 
      this time were of the Rockefeller-controlled Standard Oil family: Stanvac 
      (jointly held by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil-Socony being 
      Standard Oil of New York), and Caltex, (jointly held by Standard Oil of 
      California and Texaco.) In Part I of this article we showed how heavily 
      loaded the Freeport Sulphur board was with Rockefeller family and allies. 
      Recall that Augustus C. Long was a board member of Freeport while serving 
      as Chairman of Texaco for many years. Long becomes more and more 
      interesting as the story develops.
      1958: CIA vs. Sukarno 
      "I think its time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire," said Frank Wisner, 
      then Deputy Director of Plans for the CIA, in 1956. By 1958, having failed 
      to buy the government through the election process, the CIA was fomenting 
      a full-fledged operation in Indonesia. Operation Hike, as it was called, 
      involved the arming and training of tens of thousands of Indonesians as 
      well as "mercenaries" to launch attacks in the hope of bringing down 
      Sukarno. 
      Joseph Burkholder Smith was a former CIA officer involved with the 
      Indonesian operations during this period. In his book, Portrait of a Cold 
      Warrior, he described how the CIA took it upon themselves to make, not 
      just to enact, policy in this area: 
        before any direct action against Sukarno's position could be taken, we 
        would have to have the approval of the Special Group-the small group of 
        top National Security Council officials who approved covert action 
        plans. Premature mention of such an idea might get it shot down ...
        So we began to feed the State Department and Defense departments 
        intelligence ... When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned 
        to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels' plan to reduce 
        Sukarno's power. This was a method of operation which became the basis 
        of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In 
        other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in 
        the affairs of countries like Chile only after being ordered to do so 
        ... In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we 
        had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the 
        circumstance. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-1958 was one such 
        instance. 
      When the Ambassador to Indonesia wrote Washington of his explicit 
      disagreements with the CIA's handling of the situation, Allen Dulles had 
      his brother John Foster appoint a different Ambassador to Indonesia, one 
      more accepting of the CIA's activities. 
      In addition to the paramilitary activities, the CIA tried psychological 
      warfare tricks to discredit Sukarno, such as passing rumors that he had 
      been seduced by a Soviet stewardess. To that end, Sheffield Edwards, head 
      of the CIA's Office of Security, enlisted the Chief of the Los Angeles 
      Police Department to help with a porno movie project the CIA was making to 
      use against Sukarno, ostensibly showing Sukarno in the act. Others 
      involved in these efforts were Robert Maheu, and Bing Crosby and his 
      brother. 
      The Agency tried to keep its coup participation covert, but one 
      "mercenary" met misfortune early. Shot down and captured during a bombing 
      run, Allen Lawrence Pope was carrying all kinds of ID on his person to 
      indicate that he was an employee of the CIA. The U.S. Government, right up 
      to President Eisenhower, tried to deny that the CIA was involved at all, 
      but the Pope revelations made a mockery of this. Not cowed by the foment, 
      as Arbenz had been in Guatemala, Sukarno marshalled those forces loyal to 
      him and crushed the CIA-aided rebellion. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, this 
      was the Agency's single largest failed operation. 
      1959: Copper Mountain 
      At this point, Freeport Sulphur entered the Indonesian picture. In July, 
      1959, Charles Wight, then President of Freeport-and reported to be 
      fomenting anti-Castro plots and flying to Canada and/or Cuba with Clay 
      Shaw (see Part I of this article)-was busy defending his company against 
      House Committee accusations of overcharging the Government for the nickel 
      ore processed at the Government-owned plant in Nicaro, Cuba. The Committee 
      recommended that the Justice Department pursue an investigation. 
      Freeport's Moa Bay Mining Company had only just opened, and already the 
      future in Cuba looked bleak. In August, 1959, Freeport Director and top 
      engineer Forbes Wilson met with Jan van Gruisen, managing director of the 
      East Borneo Company, a mining concern. Gruisen had just stumbled upon a 
      dusty report first made in 1936 regarding a mountain called the "Ertsberg" 
      ("Copper Mountain") in Dutch New Guinea, by Jean Jacques Dozy. Hidden away 
      for years in a Netherlands library during Nazi attacks, the report had 
      only recently resurfaced. Dozy reported a mountain heavy with copper ore. 
      If true, this could justify a new Freeport diversification effort into 
      copper. Wilson cabled Freeport's New York headquarters asking for 
      permission and money to make a joint exploration effort with the East 
      Borneo Company. The contract was signed February 1, 1960. 
      With the aid of a native guide, Wilson spent the next several months 
      amidst the near-stone age natives as he forged through near impassable 
      places on his way to the Ertsberg. Wilson wrote a book about this journey, 
      called The Conquest of Copper Mountain. When he finally arrived, he was 
      excited at what he found: 
        an unusually high degree of mineralization ... The Ertsberg turned out 
        to be 40% to 50% iron ... and 3% copper ... Three percent is quite rich 
        for a deposit of copper ... The Ertsberg also contains certain amounts 
        of even more rare silver and gold. 
      He cabled back a message in prearranged code to the soon-to-be President 
      of Freeport, Bob Hills in New York:
        ... thirteen acres rock above ground additional 14 acres each 100 meter 
        depth sampling progressive color appears dark access egress formidable 
        all hands well advise Sextant regards. </P><P> 
      "Thirteen acres" meant 13 million tons of ore above ground. "Color appears 
      dark" meant that the grade of ore was good. "Sextant" was code for the 
      East Borneo Company. The expedition was over in July of 1960. Freeport's 
      board was not eager to go ahead with a new and predictably costly venture 
      on the heels of the expropriation of their mining facilities in Cuba. But 
      the board decided to at least press ahead with the next phase of 
      exploration: a more detailed investigation of the ore samples and 
      commercial potential. Wilson described the results of this effort: 
        [M]ining consultants confirmed our estimates of 13 million tons of ore 
        above ground and another 14 million below ground for each 100 meters of 
        depth. Other consultants estimated that the cost of a plant to process 
        5,000 tons of ore a day would be around $60 million and that the cost of 
        producing copper would be 16 a pound after credit for small amounts of 
        gold and silver associated with the copper. At the time, copper was 
        selling in world markets for around 35 a pound. From these data, 
        Freeport's financial department calculated that the company could 
        recover its investment in three years and then begin earning an 
        attractive profit. 
      The operation proved technically difficult, involving newly invented 
      helicopters and diamond drills. Complicating the situation was the 
      outbreak of a near-war between the Dutch-who were still occupying West 
      Irian-and Sukarno's forces which landed there to reclaim the land as their 
      own. Fighting even broke out near the access road to Freeport's venture. 
      By mid-1961, Freeport's engineers strongly felt that the project should be 
      pursued. But by that time, John F. Kennedy had taken over the office of 
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